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Does Morality Have a Point? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Proceeding from the assumption that moral discourse is best conceived of 
as a practice in the technical sense specified by John Rawls, this paper dis-
cusses whether it is possible, adequate or even necessary to take up a legis-
lative perspective on the constitutive rules of the practice. There seem to 
exist two principal legislative manoeuvres with respect to practices, namely 
(a) rendering the practice under consideration compatible with a practice 
that is more important and (b) evaluating the constitutive rules of the prac-
tice with respect to its point, purpose or telos. I put under scrutiny two pro-
jects in normative ethics which oﬀer an aﬃrmative answer regarding the 
possibility of moral legislation and which make use of the respective ma-
noeuvres, namely neo-Hobbesian contractarianism and rule-
consequentialism. I thereupon inquire into the merits of a position that 
draws upon broadly Wittgensteinian considerations and that denies the ex-
istence of such a thing as a legislative perspective on morality.  
 
1. Assessing Practices 
Disputes over moral questions are very common in our society. Some of 
these disputes are of an argumentative nature while others are not. How-
ever, in order for there to exist an argumentative dispute instead of a mere 
practical conflict, at some point some degree of practical agreement has to 
exist between the disputing parties. If they do not share a standard of suc-
cess with respect to moral argumentation – that is, if they do not agree on 
what counts as a good or valid argument in favour of or against a moral 
verdict – they cannot really be said to engage in an argumentative ex-
change. Viewed from this perspective, moral discourse1 seems to be a kind 	  
1.  Some philosophers have expressed doubts as to whether there exists a suﬃciently 
clear and unitary notion answering to the term “morality”. These doubts are exaggerat-
ed. Most people are competent with terms such as “immoral”, “wrong” and “reprehen-
sive”. They know what considerations can be appealed to in order to defend judgements 
containing such terms and they react to condemnations cast in these terms in ways sig-	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of practice in the technical sense defined by John Rawls as “any form of 
activity specified by a system of rules2 which defines oﬃces, roles, moves, 
penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure” 
(1955, 3).3 A practice in this technical sense should not be confused with a 
widely-shared habit or a common procedure, both of which probably sat-	  
nificantly diﬀerent from those in which they react to criticism regarding, e.g., the reason-
ableness or rationality of their actions. Moreover, they are able to train others (typically 
their children) to use the above-mentioned terms correctly. It is an entirely diﬀerent 
question, however, whether we have at our disposal a philosophical account of morality, 
i.e. an account rendering explicit the core diﬀerences between morality and other behav-
ioural standards. The philosophical account of morality that I find most promising is the 
one espoused by Stephen Darwall. According to this account, moral obligation is con-
ceptually tied to certain Strawsonian reactive attitudes (such as indignation, moral 
blame, and resentment) through which people hold each other accountable. That is, 
when we adopt such reactive attitudes, “we implicitly address demands to the objects of 
these attitudes; we take up what Strawson called an ‘inter-personal’ […] standpoint to-
wards someone and imaginatively hold her responsible” (2013a, 10). This does not happen 
when we assess someone’s behaviour as unreasonable, irrational or downright stupid. In 
these cases, “there is clearly no implicit demand that the object of […] disdain stop being 
so stupid or answer for his stupidity” (Darwall 2013a, 10). The conceptual connection be-
tween the reactive attitudes and the behavioural standard of morality is a normative one: 
whether a specific reactive attitude is warranted depends on whether the object of that 
attitude has failed to fulfil her moral obligations. Feeling indignation or resentment to-
wards someone hence presupposes feeling that she or he has fallen short of the standard 
set by morality. It has to be admitted that Darwall’s characterization of the distinctive-
ness of morality does not cover the realm of the supererogatory, since we do not hold 
each other accountable for failing to realize the most praiseworthy among our practical 
options where this does not coincide with our moral obligations. In order to account for 
the supererogatory, Darwall’s account would have to be supplemented either with a 
characterization of the conceptual connections between the supererogatory and the de-
ontic or with an independent account of the supererogatory. However, I think that the 
above remarks, though somewhat incomplete, provide a suﬃciently useful outline of 
how the term “morality” is used in the present paper. 
2.  In the present paper, I use the term “rule” in a rather wide sense that includes every-
thing that is capable of serving as a standard of correctness or adequacy. In particular, I 
will assume that paradigmatic cases too can constitute a rule and, hence, that not every 
rule has the form of an articulable principle (cf. Baker and Hacker 1984, 250–256). Moreo-
ver, when I speak of the “existence” of certain rules I mean that they “are generally in-
voked by members of a social group, directly or indirectly, in guiding, justifying, explain-
ing, identifying and teaching the behaviour to which they are relevant” (Baker and 
Hacker 1984, 262). 
3.  Precisely how powerful the resources provided by the established practice of moral 
discourse are – that is, to what extent they enable those using them to achieve conver-
gence regarding their moral verdicts – is an interesting question that I unfortunately 
cannot pursue in the present paper.  
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isfy the everyday concept of a practice, but lack the normative element 
that is part of the definition of the technical concept. 
Practices (in the technical sense outlined above) are set apart from oth-
er activities by what John Searle calls “constitutive rules” (1969, 33–42). Vi-
olating constitutive rules (e.g. the rules of chess) amounts to abandoning 
the respective practice (i.e. to not playing chess at all).4 In contrast, violat-
ing “regulatory,” “strategic,” or “instrumental” rules (e.g. the rules of cook-
ing) might result in a bad performance of the respective activity (e.g. bad 
cooking) but it does not necessarily amount to doing something that no 
longer counts as an engagement in that activity (see Wittgenstein 1974, 
184). In the case of a practice (e.g. the law or football), particular moves or 
actions within it can only be justified with respect to their legitimacy or 
validity by reference to the constitutive rules, whereas the particular steps 
in an activity such as cooking do not necessarily have to be justified by 
reference to the rules of cooking because the only thing that matters in 
the end is the result, namely good tasting food. It is possible to demon-
strate that a certain step in cooking is reasonable or justified by showing 
that it is conducive to the aim of cooking (regardless of whether there ex-
ists a corresponding rule), but there is no such thing as a “valid move” in 
cooking. In contrast, valid and invalid moves do exist in chess, but one 
cannot demonstrate the validity of one particular move by showing how it 
contributes to the aims that chess players typically pursue (e.g. the experi-
ence of an intellectual challenge combined with the excitement of compe-
tition). Since the constitutive rules of chess are not deterministic – they 
leave several options open to the players in most situations – there is 
room for rules of another kind, namely strategic rules, the disregard of 
which does not amount to not playing chess anymore (or playing a diﬀer-
ent game) but, at most, to unskilful and unsuccessful playing.5 
However, usually it is not only particular moves within a practice that 
can be assessed but also the practice itself, that is, its constitutive rules. 	  
4.  It is of course somewhat pedantic to claim that a single violation of a constitutive 
rule always results in a complete abandonment of the respective practice. This might be 
true in the case of competitive chess but it is probably not true for many other practices. 
5.  The last point is probably irrelevant with respect to the case of the practice of moral 
discourse since its constitutive rules do not explicitly allow for the existence of multiple 
valid moves in the same situation in the way the rules of chess do. The rules under con-
sideration are those that determine what does and does not count as a good reason for 
mapping certain evaluative and deontic predicates to manners of behaviour. These rules 
are not to be confused with the ensuing moral verdicts, which of course often imply that 
diﬀerent courses of action are morally permissible in certain situations. 
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There exist, so to speak, two levels of evaluation: that of the judge and that 
of the legislator (Rawls 1955, 6). One could therefore push the reflection 
one step further and ask what (if any) considerations legislators can appeal 
to in order to justify their decisions. Two types of considerations come to 
mind: firstly, the compatibility of the practice under consideration with 
other practices (in particular those which are in a certain sense more im-
portant than the one which is to be assessed) and secondly, the point or te-
los of the respective practice. “The game,” Ludwig Wittgenstein writes in 
the Philosophical Investigations (and the game is his favourite model for the 
elucidation of social practices in general), “has not only rules but also a 
point” (§564) and it can lose its point if some of its rules are changed or if 
some of the environmental conditions in which it is embedded change 
(Baker and Hacker 2009, 211–218). The work of company compliance de-
partments can be regarded as an example of the first option. Compliance 
departments assess the internal practices and policies of their company 
with respect to their compatibility with the law. The abolition of the 
“golden goal” (or “sudden death”) rule in 2004 by the International Feder-
ation of Association Football (FIFA) can serve as an example of the se-
cond option. The rule was abolished because it made the game unattrac-
tive to play as well as to watch, which is contrary to its very point.  
The question I want to discuss in the present paper is whether it is pos-
sible, rationally adequate or even necessary to take up a legislative per-
spective on morality. This question is important since it has consequences 
on the tenability of moral revisionism – at least if, as it is prima facie rea-
sonable to assume, substantial revisions of common morality cannot be 
achieved without changing the constitutive rules of moral discourse.6 
Some (though not I) might even see the fate of first-order moral philoso-
phy as a critical enterprise to be at stake here.7 Several well-known pro-	  
6.  Many philosophers seem to assume that the constitutive rules of moral discourse are 
rather minimalistic or formalistic (i.e. requiring only such things as coherence); however, 
in order to argue for a certain substantive position, they need to make somewhat conten-
tious manoeuvres elsewhere. They need, for example, to postulate a shared quasi-
perceptive and rather obscure epistemic faculty (intuition) that delivers beliefs endowed 
with a certain initial plausibility, on which the minimalistic constitutive rules of dis-
course can then operate. I, however, will proceed from the assumption that the constitu-
tive rules of moral discourse themselves provide all of the argumentative resources 
available to the participants of moral disputes. 
7.  Taking a critical stance vis-à-vis popular moral opinions does not need to consist in 
criticizing the constitutive rules of moral discourse since it can also consist in criticizing 
the way other people make use of the rules or showing that, appearances to the contrary 	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jects in moral philosophy can be regarded as committing themselves im-
plicitly or explicitly to a certain position regarding the question set out 
above. I will take a closer look at two of these projects, namely neo-
Hobbesian contractarianism and rule-consequentialism, explain in what 
way they commit themselves to a certain position regarding the possibil-
ity of moral legislation, and assess the validity of the respective positions. I 
have chosen these two accounts because (a) they are more recent and so-
phisticated than others, (b) they constitute particularly clear instances of 
the two legislation manoeuvres mentioned above, (c) they are laudably 
explicit about what they regard as the requirements a moral code or prac-
tice needs to meet, and (d) they represent the two families of theory in 
normative ethics that are commonly taken to have the strongest revision-
ist potential, which of course indicates that they hold legislative ambitions 
that are more pronounced than those of their competitors (e.g. particular-
ism, pluralism, virtue ethics, contractualism, and Kantianism).8 Subse-
quently, I will lay out some of the arguments in favour of and against the 
autonomist position, i.e. the position according to which there can be no 
such thing as a legislative enterprise in morality.  
Before setting out to do just that, I would like to quickly address one 
worry which threatens to stop the whole inquiry in its tracks, namely that 
regarding morality as a practice is mistaken in the first place. There are 
two interconnected considerations that fuel this suspicion. Firstly, with 
most practices one can choose to participate in them but one cannot 
choose one’s morals. One can decide to play football and one can decide 
to participate in a certain institution with defined oﬃces, processes, etc. In 
contrast, it seems impossible to decide whether to participate in morality 
– it is not even clear what that is supposed to mean. People who make 
moral judgements usually have not chosen to do so. They simply find 	  
notwithstanding, they do not make use of them at all. That philosophers are well-suited 
for this job is suggested by the fact that they usually are better trained than most others 
to be on the guard against some of the factors that tend to distort moral judgements and 
are therefore in a position to apply the mentioned rules more expertly than others. They 
usually also have a larger amount of comparable cases in the back of their minds when 
thinking about how to assess a certain case, which helps them to discover tensions and 
inconsistencies between diﬀerent case judgements (cf. for example, Jonsen 1993, 436). 
8.  Even though I think that the two chosen accounts exhibit weaknesses characteristic 
of attempts at moral legislation in general, I of course admit that a sample limited to two 
cases cannot be regarded as representative. Hence, the discussion of the two cases should 
be regarded as an attempt to illustrate a certain problem, and not as an attempt to con-
clusively prove the impossibility of moral legislation. 
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themselves doing it. One can decide whether or not to participate in a 
moral discourse but one cannot decide whether or not one is being sin-
cere when doing so, i.e. whether one really engages in moral judgement. 
However, the possibility to decide about participating in a given activi-
ty does not constitute a necessary condition for its being a practice be-
cause participating in a practice can become second nature to us. This is 
arguably the case with our mastery of concepts. Once one has acquired a 
certain concept, one usually cannot help but perceive certain things as 
fulfilling that concept. When one acquires a concept, one acquires a set of 
discriminatory and inferential abilities, but these abilities partly rest on 
one-way dispositions, that is, dispositions about the realization of which 
one cannot decide (see Glock 2010, 100–101; Ertz 2008, 30). The hallmark 
of a practice is constituted rather by a certain normative embedment of 
the respective actions or, more specifically, by the ability of the agents to 
make, recognize and correct mistakes of a certain form, namely those that 
can be criticized by reference to constitutive (rather than regulative) rules 
(see Glock 2000, 45). Applications of a concept – even if they are not sub-
ject to one’s will – can be mistaken in this way (see Glock 2010, 101) as can, 
according to the claim under consideration, moral judgements and the 
arguments upon which the former are based. Certain reactions and forms 
of behaviour might superficially resemble legitimate moves within the 
practice of moral discourse but nevertheless amount to a partial aban-
donment of the practice since they do not conform to its constitutive 
rules. 
Secondly, one could protest that, truth rather than conformity to the 
rules of a practice is the sole measure of the adequacy of a “move” within 
moral discourse. To this, one could however simply reply that it is the 
moral practice that determines what counts as true or correct and what 
does not. This option cannot be swiftly dismissed since it is able to meet 
three requirements, more or less straightforwardly, which have proven to 
be major obstacles for the traditional contenders in the meta-ethical de-
bate, namely (1) ontological parsimony (by conceiving of moral discourse 
as a “practically enriched language-game” (Kiesselbach 2012, 7) sui generis 
instead of a discourse about super-natural or “make-believe” properties of 
actions); (2) the ability to account for the argumentative or non-
subjectivist structure of moral discourse (by emphasizing the importance 
of shared standards of argumentative success, i.e. standards that deter-
mine what counts as a valid justification move); and (3) the ability to ac-
count for the practicality (or “motivational force”) of moral judgements 
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(by assuming that the satisfaction of certain emotional and motivational 
conditions is among the ascription criteria for moral convictions9). Fur-
thermore, conceiving of morality as a kind of practice is also in tune with 
what we know about how people become acquainted with moral stand-
ards. It is, after all, no secret that we are trained and educated to judge and 
conditioned to feel in certain ways by our parents, nursery-school teach-
ers, etc. and that we as adults constantly keep each other in line by sanc-
tioning certain forms of behaviour and asking for justification. 
It is true, however, that by regarding something as a practice one ex-
cludes it from the realm of things that can be evaluated in respect to their 
truth. Only particular moves within the practice can be correct or incor-
rect (and, arguably, true or false), not the practice itself. However, it is not 
a general defence of accounts conceiving of morality as a practice that I 
am concerned with in the present paper, but rather the question of 
whether, provided that morality can be regarded as a practice, there is 
reason to assume that such a thing as a legislative perspective on it exists. 
I will begin my inquiry by discussing two positions that answer this ques-
tion in the aﬃrmative. 
2. Morality as Restricted by Instrumental Rationality 
One way of formulating the core idea of neo-Hobbesian contractarianism 
is that morality cannot ask us to do anything that rationality would not al-
low and that rationality has to be understood in the more or less well-
known instrumentalist way. A recent and very staunch defender of this 
idea is the German philosopher Peter Stemmer. He argues that in view of 
the religious origins of common moral practice one has to reckon with the 
possibility that participation in it is no longer rational once the respective 
religious assumptions are abandoned. Should this be true, one should 
seek to replace common morality with something that is rationally defen-
sible even without the religious framework in which the former used to be 
embedded (2000, 6–10).  
	  
9.  By making such an assumption, one accepts that people without the right emotion-
al-cum-motivational make-up (induced by what is known as a “good upbringing,” i.e. 
early conditioning or training) – be they intelligent or not – are not fit for full participa-
tion in the moral practice. One accepts that even the best moral argument fails to induce 
the according moral conviction in certain individuals. 
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As is well known, neo-Hobbesian contractarianism is heavily revision-
istic. This revisionism is mainly due to the fact that creatures with limited 
intellectual abilities have neither the bargaining power nor the rational 
self-control required to take part in a quasi-contractual agreement that 
could work in their favour. Animals, for example, fall completely out of 
the scope of morality. It is thus not much of an exaggeration to say that 
those most in need of protection are the ones least protected by contrac-
tarian morality (Stemmer 2000, 198–199; 210; 255–264).10 Stemmer sets the-
se consequences out very clearly and tells us that, as intellectually respon-
sible people, we have no choice but to live with them – be this comforta-
ble or not.11 
What happens here is that common morality (or the established moral 
practice) is measured against another behavioural standard, namely that 
of instrumentalist rationality. It is found to be deficient and, accordingly, 
is replaced by a practice not only consistent with the standard of instru-
mentalist rationality but whose establishment is even demanded by it. 
Given that this whole manoeuvre is built upon granting exclusive norma-
tive authority (or at least strict normative priority) to the standard of in-
strumentalist rationality, Stemmer says surprisingly little on this ques-
tion. It seems that, according to him, instrumentalist rationality is simply 
the only intelligible conception of practical rationality (cf. 2000, 16–22).12 
David Gauthier, the “godfather” of neo-Hobbesian contractarianism, is a 
bit more explicit with respect to this point: “There is,” he writes, “simply 
nothing else for practical rationality to be” (1991, 20). However, the incom-
patibility between instrumentalist rationality and common morality is not 
at all surprising; it has been a well-known fact for a long time. The much 
more interesting question is which (if any) of the two incompatible behav-	  
10.  Hence the joke that “Hobbesian contractarianism contracts morality beyond plausi-
bility” (Hooker 2000, 7). It should be noticed, however, that neo-Hobbesian contractari-
ans usually do not embrace doing justice to the established moral practice (or to our 
“considered judgements”) as their philosophical aim (cf. Stemmer 2000, 247; 263–264). 
11.  See also Gauthier (1987, 17–18; 268–269), who espouses a similar position. 
12.  Compare what Stemmer writes with respect to what he regards as the Kantian con-
ception of practical rationality: “The decisive question at issue is what it is supposed to 
mean that an action is reasonable in and of itself as opposed to reasonable in virtue of 
being the best means of attaining a given aim of a person. In my assessment, it contra-
dicts the meaning of “reasonable” to say of an action that it is reasonable, period. Such 
talk seems to be without specifiable meaning, since the phenomena to which it refers do 
not exist: There are no actions which are simply and absolutely reasonable [my transla-
tion]” (2000, 24).  
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ioural standards should be granted normative priority over the other. Ac-
cording to Gauthier, “it is diﬃcult to deny that deliberative justification 
[i.e. maximization of the agent’s expected utility] is more clearly basic, 
that it cannot be avoided insofar as we are rational agents, so that if moral 
justification conflicts with it, morality seems not only unsupported but 
opposed by what is rationally more fundamental” (1991, 19). What accord-
ing to him makes instrumental rationality so fundamental is that it “re-
lates to our deep sense of self” (1991, 19). Elaborating on this point, he de-
picts the instrumentalist mode of reasoning as a more or less inevitable 
oﬀspring of the human capacity to represent states of aﬀairs – either as 
something that is the case or as something we want to be the case. By rep-
resenting our wants and beliefs, we “bring them into relation with one 
another,” which allows us to recognize conflicts among them and hence, 
“rationality thrust[s] upon [us],” forcing us to “bring our conflicting de-
sires and preferences into some sort of coherence. And there is only one 
plausible candidate for a principle of coherence – a maximizing principle. 
We order our preferences, in relation to decision and action, so that we 
may choose in a way that maximizes our expectation of preference fulfil-
ment” (1991, 19–20). However, depicting instrumental reasoning as a men-
tal process which takes place more or less inevitably or which simply 
amounts to what humans qua humans do because of their general psycho-
logical make-up does not help in the least to show that it is superior to 
other modes of reasoning. If anything, it shows that we are no longer talk-
ing about a normative standard because it must be possible to fall short of 
such a standard, even for people normally equipped in their intellectual 
abilities – especially if the standard under consideration aspires to be a 
moral standard.13 
Furthermore, instrumentalist rationality is not only incompatible with 
common morality; it is also incompatible with reasonableness in the 
commonly understood meaning of the term. Reasonableness is the generic 
commendatory predicate preferred by the virtuous person (i.e. the adher-
ent of common morality). In his influential What We Owe to Each Other, T. 
M. Scanlon uses the concept of reasonableness to formulate the core idea 	  
13.  According to P. F. Strawson, we abandon or at least suspend the “participant atti-
tude” that manifests itself in specifically moral reactions such as blaming, feeling re-
sentment and indignation in favour of an “objective attitude” when we are confronted 
with agents who we regard as psychologically impaired or abnormal (deranged, warped, 
neurotic, compulsive etc.) (2008, 9–10). This indicates that it is mentally normally 
equipped people who are the primary objects of moral assessment. 
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of his brand of moral contractualism. He explicitly sets his concept of rea-
sonableness apart from the instrumentalist concept of rationality and 
maintains that this distinction “is not a technical one, but a familiar dis-
tinction in ordinary language” (1998, 192), in which he is joined by Peter 
Hacker, who writes: 
 
[O]ne may be rational in pursuit of foolish, unreasonable or evil goals, if 
one chooses means appropriate to their attainment. Rationality is closely 
tied to instrumentality – the choice of eﬃcient means to ends – and to for-
mal correctness in reasoning. Like reasonableness, rationality is also tied to 
freedom from the distorting eﬀects of bias and emotion on thinking. But 
reasonableness, unlike rationality, is more closely linked to the apprecia-
tion of values and their multiplicity, and to awareness of the legitimate 
concerns of others and hence too to the ability to find appropriate ‘balance’ 
between conflicting demands of situations and people. One is reasonable if 
one does not go beyond the limits assigned by reason: if one is undogmatic 
and therefore open to countervailing considerations, if one is not insensi-
tive to the interests of others, not extravagant or immoderate in one’s ex-
pectations, and not excessive in one’s demands and aims. (2007, 202) 
 
The sole fact that the distinction between rationality and reasonableness 
is more or less firmly established in ordinary language and that the ad-
herents of common morality favour what is reasonable over what is ra-
tional (according to the instrumentalist conception) does not speak in fa-
vour of either one of the two combinations of behavioural standards (in-
strumental rationality combined with contractarian morality or reasona-
bleness combined with common morality). The point is rather that sever-
al diﬀerent commendatory concepts (which resemble each other to a cer-
tain degree14) obviously exist, that people live by them and that this plu-
rality destroys the plausibility of any claim according to which only one of 
the respective standards (e.g. that of instrumentalist rationality) is con-
ceivable or intelligible. It should be clear that it is possible to raise people 
such that they adhere to any one of these standards and to regard them as 
“intuitively plausible.” One could argue that history and global cultural 
variety have proven that. If something like instrumental rationality seems 	  
14.  As becomes apparent from the passage above taken from Hacker, the concept of 
reasonableness incorporates certain aspects of the concept of instrumentalist rationality. 
I want to add that I have certain doubts about whether the everyday use of the term ‘ra-
tional’ corresponds to the instrumentalist definition of it, for it is not at all uncommon to 
hear people speak of ‘irrational desires’ or ‘irrational emotions’.  
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to be inescapable, this might well be due to the fact that using the means 
one regards as suitable for the attainment of a certain outcome if the op-
portunity arises is one of the criteria for the attribution of a respective 
aim, plan, purpose or intention to a person. However, insofar as it is con-
ceptually possible to have certain desires without using the means neces-
sary for their fulfilment, one can imagine alternatives to the normative 
standard of instrumentalist rationality. Arguably, such an alternative 
standard is inherent in the common concept of reasonableness. 
It is unlikely that contractarians like Stemmer would give in at this 
point. Stemmer would probably want to object that, unlike instrumental-
ist rationality and contractarian morality, reasonableness and common 
morality are behavioural standards, the enforcement of which some peo-
ple (in particular the so-called amoralists or moral skepticists) will not 
voluntarily agree to. If one wanted to use common morality and reasona-
bleness as the primary behavioural standards of a society, one would have 
to do it without the consent of certain people, which, according to Stem-
mer, would be tantamount to extortion (Stemmer 2000, 51; 107–120; 364–
374). However, at this point in the dialectic, Stemmer is not in a position to 
rely on the moral force of words like “extortion” since doing so would be 
to already presuppose a certain substantial conception of morality.15 In 
any case, we usually do not care all too much about whether the person 
whose behaviour we assess by reference to the standard of common mo-
rality actually accepts that standard. It might be true that under a contrac-
tarian morality there would be fewer “outlaws” (as Stemmer calls those 
who do not accept a given moral standard (2000, 154–155)) compared to a 
situation in which a morality richer in content is the prevalent behaviour-
al standard: however, unless one already presupposes morality to serve a 
certain purpose (the attainment of which would be endangered by the ex-
istence of too large a number of outlaws), this fact does not by itself pro-
vide an argument in favour of contractarian morality. 
There is a further objection that the adherents of contractarianism 
might want to raise. They might argue that common morality (as well as 
its favoured concept of reasonableness) is not intellectually respectable 	  
15.  This is the case even if what Stemmer had in mind was not relying on the normative 
force of moral idioms, but on the Kantian idea of self-legislation as a source of legitima-
tion, i.e. the idea that the legitimacy of morality stems from the fact that it is a law which 
we, qua free and rational beings, subject ourselves to. That (properly qualified) consent to 
a behavioural standard legitimates the authority of the standard is a substantial norma-
tive claim.  
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since it emerged as part of a theonomous world-view and is therefore 
burdened by dubious ontological presuppositions. This, however, is not 
so clear. It might well be the case that common morality historically de-
rives from a practice that was embedded in a theonomous world-view but 
this does not mean that the present practice still incorporates noxious on-
tology. Part of what makes practice-based accounts of morality attractive 
is that they conceive of morality primarily as a “practically enriched lan-
guage-game” (Kiesselbach 2012, 7) that is more or less independent of em-
pirical discourse and thereby avoid the representationalist prejudices that 
lead certain philosophers to ascribe weird ontological assumptions to 
those who make moral judgements. Moreover, the way people commonly 
justify their moral judgements does not by itself raise the suspicion that 
these judgements refer to a dubious “super-natural reality” that is not ac-
cessible through the ordinary senses or our scientific instruments. People 
commonly use analogies and morally enriched descriptions (like “un-
grateful,” “intolerant,” “discriminatory,” etc.) in order to specify and justi-
fy their moral judgements. In what way this could be said to involve a ref-
erence to super-natural entities is far from obvious. Compare this to cer-
tain forms of religious discourse where character traits and actions are as-
cribed to non-incarnated person-like entities that allegedly exist beyond 
space and time. Even if those parts of religious discourse have to be un-
derstood in a non-literal way (e.g. allegorically), it is obvious that they are, 
at least at the surface, modelled after certain forms of empirical discourse 
and thereby invite critics to apply the same standards to them as are usu-
ally applied to empirical discourse.16 It is not the case then, that people, 
insofar they possess a “reasonable ontology,” subscribe to assumptions or 
hold attitudes incompatible with wholehearted participation in the com-
mon moral practice. 
What proposals like the one espoused by Stemmer ultimately amount 
to, is outlining a certain normative practice that diﬀers from the estab-
lished moral practice and using it to attack those parts of the established 
moral practice which do not conform to it. Such an attack is, pace Stem-
mer, not based on convictions shared by the adherents of common moral-
ity. Representationalist prejudices aside, there is no reason to assume that 	  
16.  It has to be conceded, though, that the lamentable tendency of many ethicists (as 
well as analytical philosophers in general) to refer to exercises of their moral (or linguis-
tic) faculty of judgement as “intuitions” works in favour of those who try to assimilate 
morality to certain forms of religion (and their epistemology of “divine aﬄatus”). 
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by participating wholeheartedly in the common moral practice, one 
makes dubious ontological commitments. Moreover, it is not the case that 
participants of the common moral practice, insofar they are intelligent be-
ings, implicitly accept the normative standard of instrumentalist rationali-
ty – they accept instrumental rationality only insofar as it is restricted to 
morally acceptable means and directed at the attainment of morally ac-
ceptable ends. In the end, the relation between common morality and 
neo-Hobbesian contractarianism comes down to a clash between two 
“pragmatically inconsistent” forms of life (cf. Arrington 1989, 260–261) 
since the proponents of each cannot refute the position of the other on 
neutral grounds, that is, grounds which the other accepts.  
3. The Promotion of Wellbeing as the Point of Morality 
An account of morality that tries to do justice to the major features and 
contents of common morality while at the same time trying to take up an 
evaluative or legislative perspective on it, is Brad Hooker’s brand of rule-
consequentialism (2000, 16–19; 29–31; 104). As Hooker sees it, “the fact 
[t]hat rule-consequentialism is in some ways like familiar deontological 
views has always been a large part of the theory’s attraction. Rule-
consequentialism’s implications about which acts are morally right match 
quite closely our common-sense, deontological intuitions” (2000, 111).17 
What distinguishes rule-consequentialism from deontological accounts is 
of course its characteristic way of attempting to provide a justification for 
the corresponding moral rules. As is well known, the core of rule-
consequentialism consists of the thought that we should “try to live by the 
moral code whose communal acceptance would, as far as we can tell, have 
the best consequences” (Hooker 2000, 1). Thus, according to Hooker, the 
rules of common morality can be regarded as justified if they can be 
shown to be equal or superior to every other set of rules with respect to 
the production of good consequences. 	  
17.  There are two respects in which the fact that rule-consequentialism’s verdicts coin-
cide more or less with our pre-philosophical moral convictions can be regarded as some-
thing counting in favour of rule-consequentialism: it can either be regarded as straight-
forward evidence in favour of rule-consequentialism or as something indicating that no 
hidden change of topic has occurred, that is, as something giving credence to the claim 
that rule-consequentialism should be regarded as an arguably better version of what we 
do when we engage in everyday moral practice rather than something completely diﬀer-
ent. 
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One might wonder at this point – if the standard which is used for the 
evaluation of consequences is (at least partially) a moral one – whether 
this is not a circular and therefore invalid move: if a moral standard (par-
tially) determines what counts as good, how can the very same standard 
be evaluated with respect to the goodness of the consequences it produc-
es? One could counter that such worries regarding circularity arise only if 
one fails to distinguish between the diﬀerent parts of morality. There is a 
part of morality concerned with questions of good and bad (i.e. the evalu-
ative part) and then there is a part of morality concerned with questions 
of right and wrong (i.e. the deontological part). Assessing the deontologi-
cal part of morality on the basis of the evaluative part is not circular in an 
obvious way. It would be circular if the good could not be defined inde-
pendently of the right but that, of course, is a highly disputed issue. It is, at 
least according to one of the classical accounts of the distinction between 
consequentialist and deontological accounts, the defining feature of con-
sequentialism to oﬀer such independent conceptions of the good – typi-
cally ones which identify the good with the aggregate wellbeing of sen-
tient beings.18 
The interesting question is of course why we should think it possible, 
adequate or even necessary to measure the deontological system against 
the evaluative system. On the face of it, we are simply looking at two 
diﬀerent systems that single out diﬀerent things for diﬀerent treatments 
or, more specifically, diﬀerent forms of reactive behaviour and reactive at-
titudes. The deontological system identifies targets for blame, indignation, 
anger, outrage and a range of sanctioning behaviour (e.g. withdrawal of 
goodwill, cooperation, trust, friendship etc.), while the evaluative system 
identifies targets for praise, admiration and gratitude and determines the 
intensity of the reactive attitudes against violations of the deontological 
code. Why, it could be asked at this point, should the two systems be 
played out against each other? It is natural to think that one should meas-
ure A against B if B is either more accurate, more reliable or more im-
portant than A (in a relevant way), but in the case under consideration it is 	  
18.  Diﬀerent views about what exactly constitutes wellbeing in sentient beings (ranging 
from “objective-list theories” over hedonistic theories to desire-fulfilment-theories) of 
course exist. Not least because these theories deliver largely converging verdicts about 
what contributes to the wellbeing of creatures in most of the situations in which people 
find themselves, we can at this point stay neutral with respect to which of these accounts 
is correct (as does Hooker (2000, 42)). 
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unclear in what way the evaluative system could be regarded to be more 
accurate, more reliable or more important than the deontological system. 
It is only in respect to the range of application that the evaluative system 
seems to be superior to the deontological system: evaluative predicates 
can be applied to a wider range of things than their deontological coun-
terparts. Whereas actions, attitudes, reasons, practices, institutions, per-
sons and states of aﬀairs can all be good or bad, only actions and attitudes 
can be right or wrong. Thus, one might think that the reason why the de-
ontological system should be measured against the evaluative system but 
not vice versa lies in the simple fact that the first is located in the second’s 
area of application while the reverse is not the case. This, however, is not 
entirely convincing, since if one regards moral codes (or parts of them) as 
subject to deliberative modification by us, one also has to accept the pos-
sibility of assessing our upholding of a certain evaluative system on the 
basis of the deontological system. In other words, it is unclear why, given 
that one regards moral codes as possible objects of modification, one 
should not regard it as possible to criticize someone for upholding an 
evaluative system which assigns positive value to morally impermissible 
actions (e.g. killing one person in order to save two from dying).  
Defenders of consequentialism could at this point complain that the 
remarks made above almost make it sound as if it were a lucky coinci-
dence that the currently-established deontological system is by and large 
conducive to the production of wellbeing (cf. Ertz 2008, 216). However, 
opponents of consequentialism are certainly not committed to such a 
claim. They can happily admit that (a) there exist rather obvious logical 
connections between the concepts of goodness and rightness and (b) the 
production of certain forms of wellbeing and the prevention of certain 
forms of suﬀering in one way or another occupy an important (if not nec-
essarily an exclusive) role in determining what counts as a good action ac-
cording to the evaluative standard that is a part of common morality. Tak-
ing into account that an action which is morally good cannot be morally 
wrong and that an action which is morally wrong cannot be morally good, 
it is not surprising that acting in accordance with the deontological stand-
ard is by and large conducive to the production of good actions and, ac-
cordingly, to the production of a certain amount of wellbeing. Yet, as long 
as the opponents of consequentialism insist on the existence of such a 
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thing as the realm of the supererogatory,19 they can escape the conclusion 
that the exclusive point of the deontological system belonging to common 
morality is to maximize the wellbeing of sentient creatures.  
But what would we say, a defender of consequentialism could ask, 
about a deontological system that is less conducive to the production of 
wellbeing of sentient creatures than that of common morality? Is it not the 
case that we would criticize such a system precisely for its failure to pro-
duce enough wellbeing (or even as much wellbeing as possible)? And 
would we not say that a deontological system, the inculcation of which in 
the majority of people would not produce any wellbeing at all or would 
even produce much suﬀering, somehow misses the whole point of morali-
ty? These suggestions might sound appealing at first, but they provide no 
decisive advantage for the defenders of the consequentialist position since 
their opponents can, arguably with equal plausibility, state that our prin-
ciple reason for rejecting deontological systems of the mentioned sort lies 
simply in their divergence from the deontological system that we have al-
ready internalized. 
It has to be admitted, though, that Brad Hooker’s case in favour of rule-
consequentialism is much more sophisticated than the above-made re-
marks would suggest. At the beginning of his book, he presents a cata-
logue of five criteria for the assessment of a moral theory:  
 
(1) It must start from attractive general beliefs about morality. 
(2) It must be internally consistent. 
(3) It must cohere with our considered convictions. 
(4) It should tie together our various principles and provide impartial 
justification for them. 
(5) It should help us deal with unresolved moral questions. (2000, 1–
31) 
 
According to Hooker, neo-Hobbesian contractarianism starts from the 
appealing idea “that morality is a system of mutually beneficial co-
operation” (2000, 7) and hence performs well with respect to criterion (1) 	  
19.  I.e. the existence of situations in which several of the available courses of action are 
morally permissible even though they are not equally good. 
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(as do, according to him, all of the popular theories in normative ethics). 
There is also no conclusive reason to think that neo-Hobbesian contrac-
tarianism is internally inconsistent, hence it also meets criterion (2). How-
ever, since the moral code favoured by neo-Hobbesian contractarianism 
oﬀers no protection at all for some of the most weak and vulnerable crea-
tures, it fails with respect to criterion (3). A similar diagnosis applies to 
classical act-consequentialism: it starts from an attractive idea about mo-
rality (i.e. that the wellbeing of every sentient being is equally important) 
and is internally consistent, but in demanding excessive self-sacrifice it 
parts from our considered convictions. Ross-style moral pluralism and 
particularism might be able to meet criteria (1) – (3), but they fail with re-
spect to criteria (4) and (5) since they leave us with an “unconnected heap” 
of obligations (Joseph 1931, 67), refuse to oﬀer justification for them, and 
are often unable to provide us with guidance with respect to diﬃcult mor-
al questions (especially in cases where diﬀerent prima-facie duties con-
flict). In contrast, rule-consequentialism succeeds on all counts. 
It is of course disputable whether one should accept all of the listed cri-
teria for the evaluation of moral theories. I wish to focus on criterion (4) in 
particular, since it seems to play a particularly important role in Hooker’s 
case in favour of rule-consequentialism. In order to see why, one must 
familiarize oneself with one of the most popular objections against rule-
consequentialism: namely, its alleged inconsistence. If rule-
consequentialism can be prevented from collapsing into act-
consequentialism,20 then there can be circumstances in which an agent 	  
20.  That it falls victim to such a collapse is the conclusion of another popular objection 
against rule-consequentialism. In its most common version, the objection is based on the 
assumption that, by adding increasingly detailed exception clauses to a moral code, one 
can optimize its production of good consequences. However, “[o]nce all the exception 
clauses are added, rule-consequentialism will have the same implications for action that 
act-consequentialism has” (Hooker 2000, 96). The defenders of rule-consequentialism 
like to reply at this point that the process of specification has to stop at some point before 
the extensional collapse into act-utilitarianism because of the increasing risks and costs 
of inculcating a large number of increasingly complex rules in cognitively and motiva-
tionally limited creatures like humans. The problem, however, is that blindly following 
simple rules such as “keep your promises” can result in disaster under unfavourable cir-
cumstances. Hence, adherents of rule-consequentialism like to incorporate a “prevent 
disaster” rule capable of overriding all other rules in the code. This does not amount to 
an acceptance of act-consequentialism, since the “prevent disaster” rule applies only in 
cases where the diﬀerence with respect to the amount of expected value between the ac-
tion prescribed by the code and another action reaches a certain threshold (Hooker 
2000, 95–99). Act-consequentialists might object that the introduction of an inevitably 	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has to follow certain moral rules even though she or he knows that this 
will not maximize the good in this particular situation – but how can this 
be compatible with the ultimate goal of the rule-consequentialist, which is 
to produce as much good as possible? Hooker’s first line of defence 
against this objection is to hint at the possibility that the general internali-
zation of rule-consequentialism might actually produce better conse-
quences than the general internalization of act-consequentialism (be-
cause act-consequentialism is likely to be plagued by a number of issues 
such as ineﬃciency, negative expectation eﬀects and horrendous internal-
ization costs) (2000, 99–100). This might be true, but it is not clear whether 
it helps to ease the tension an actual agent might experience when con-
fronted with a situation where deviating from the code would foreseeably 
produce more good than acting in accordance with it. This is where 
Hooker’s second line of defence comes into play. According to Hooker, 
the fundamental moral motivation of a rule-consequentialist does not 
have to be an overarching commitment to maximize the good. Her or his 
fundamental moral motivation might rather be to do what is impartially 
defensible – a motivation which, when combined with the beliefs that act-
ing on impartially justified rules is impartially defensible and that rule-
consequentialism is the best account of an impartially justified set of 
rules, makes her or him as good a rule-consequentialist as one could wish 
for (2000, 101–102). 
The interesting question is of course how impartiality is to be under-
stood in this context and why one should grant it such a decisive role in 
the assessment of moral codes. Hooker acknowledges the existence of at 
least three diﬀerent senses of impartiality. Firstly, there is a “minimal 
sense” of impartiality, “according to which impartiality requires merely 
that [certain] rules or considerations [which are taken as given] be applied 
impartially, that is, in an unbiased way” (2000, 23–24). Secondly, there is a 
sense of impartiality which refers to the scope of rules or considerations. 
Impartiality in this second sense requires certain rules or considerations 
(which again are taken as given) to “apply to all cases that have exactly the 
same universal features” (2000, 25). Finally, there is a sense of impartiality 	  
arbitrary threshold for the direct maximization of wellbeing looks very much like an ad 
hoc manoeuvre, i.e. a manoeuvre motivated solely by the aim of avoiding act-
consequentialism. The defenders of rule-consequentialism will however try to counter 
this objection by arguing for the claim that the general internalization of rule-
consequentialism (including a somewhat arbitrary “prevent disaster” clause) produces 
better consequences than the general internalization of act-consequentialism. 
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which is more fundamental since it does not take certain rules or consid-
erations as given but rather aspires to constitute a justifiability criterion 
for them (2000, 25–26). It is this last sense of impartiality that, according to 
Hooker, is relevant to the characterization of the proper motivation of a 
moral agent as well as to the assessment of moral codes. Regarding the 
question of what this fundamental impartiality amounts to, Hooker 
claims that “the most obvious conception […] remains one holding the 
wellbeing of each to have equal importance in the sense that benefits or 
harms to one individual matter exactly the same as do the same size ben-
efits or harms to any other individual” (2000, 26). Another popular con-
ception of fundamental impartiality he mentions is the one espoused by 
Rawls according to which principles are impartially justified only if they 
could get the uncoerced consent of rational persons behind the veil of ig-
norance (see 1999, 160–168). 
Whichever conception of fundamental impartiality is ultimately pre-
ferred, it is interesting to ask what enables the concept of impartiality to 
play such an important role in the assessment of moral codes. There are 
two interconnected worries regarding the work the concept of impartiali-
ty is assigned to do: firstly, there is the worry that, regardless of whether 
the concept of impartiality is applied to the application of a rule or to the 
rule itself, its function seems to consist in tracking deviations from a pre-
supposed standard that benefit a certain party to the cost of another. Ap-
plying the concept to a code (instead of its application) might thus come 
down to nothing more than saying that it does not deviate from the right 
code in the way mentioned above (i.e. the code that really determines 
what makes people owe certain things to each other and what makes peo-
ple deserve certain things) without telling us anything about what that 
code looks like.21 Interestingly, Hooker makes an analogous point with re-
spect to the concept of desert: 
 
[T]he claim that people should get what they deserve can be heard as the 
tautology that people should be treated as the balance of relevant moral 
reasons require. Here again we see a moral concept being used so broadly 
as to require for its application an account of all other moral reasons. (2000, 
47) 
 	  
21.  This seems to be happening in the case of the Rawlsian conception of impartiality, 
where the totality of the substantial normative contents enters via the list of pieces of in-
formation that are filtered out by the veil of ignorance. 
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However, even if we assume that the above-mentioned worry is unsub-
stantiated because the concept of impartiality really has an intension 
specifiable independently from a calculation of the overall balance of rea-
sons, there is a second worry, namely that the relevant concept of impar-
tiality is a moral concept (and the implied demand a moral demand) and 
thus forms a part of the very code which is being assessed by reference to 
it. If this is indeed the case, the intended assessment manoeuvre can only 
be saved from vicious circularity by excluding this particular element of 
the code from the assessment, thereby promoting it to a sort of fundamen-
tal value by removing the limitations that result from the co-presence of 
other values. Something along these lines seems to be what Frank Jackson 
has in mind when he writes: 
 
Although […] we should seek the best way of constructing a coherent theo-
ry out of folk morality, respecting as much as possible those parts that we 
find most appealing, to form mature folk morality, it may well be that one 
part or other of the network is fundamental in the sense that our search for 
mature folk morality will go best if we seek to derive the whole story start-
ing at that part. The history of ethical theory is full of attempts to identify, 
out of the mass of moral opinions we find initially appealing, a relatively 
small number of fundamental insights from which all of what we find (or 
will or would find) most plausible under critical reflection […] can be de-
rived. (1998, 134) 
 
Unfortunately, it is entirely unclear which standard of success Jackson in-
tends to appeal to when he writes that a part of morality can be regarded 
as fundamental if the “search for mature folk morality will go best [my 
emphasis] if we seek to derive the whole story starting at that part.” Inas-
much as it is unclear which standard of success is involved in such a 
claim, there is no reason to assume that a new code, be it inspired by a 
particular element of common morality or not, is superior to the latter. 
Be that as it may, it certainly is the case that a plea for moral change 
has a much better chance of being regarded as a rational and legitimate 
demand (rather than an arational persuasion manoeuvre) if it can be pre-
sented as a natural expansion of a value that is already to some extent part 
of the established canon.22 Those who fight for ideological change usually 	  
22.  Arguably, this is what happens when the scope of the requirement of impartiality 
in the sense of an equal concern for the wellbeing of all members of a specific group is 
expanded so as to include not only one’s closest family but every sentient being. A com-
parable expansion attempt is sometimes performed on the value of tolerance. 
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do not invent new values; they try to expand on particular values that are 
already widely shared by claiming either that the respective values are 
more fundamental than others (cf. Hanfling 1997, 547) or that they draw 
upon a deeper, more sophisticated or more consequent understanding of 
them (cf. Murdoch 2001, 27–29). However, it is neither suﬃciently clear 
what being “more fundamental” than other values amounts to23 nor what 
it means for an understanding of a value to be “deeper,” “more sophisti-
cated” or “more consequent” than the one that is widely shared. Unfortu-
nately, this is a question that cannot be further pursued in the confines of 
the present paper. I content myself with pointing out that, whatever an 
investigation of this question would bring to light, it seems safe to say that 
the pressure to uphold the appearance of continuity with (parts of) the es-
tablished moral practice is rather high, even for those who intend to criti-
cize it. I shall say somewhat more on the subject of moral change at the 
end of the following section, in which I discuss the merits of the position 
that denies the possibility of a legislative perspective on morality. 
4. Morality as a Teleologically Autonomous Practice 
In the last two sections of the present paper, I discussed two positions ac-
cording to which it is possible to take up a legislative perspective on mo-
rality. I will now turn my attention to the position that denies that possi-
bility. The idea that morality is a practice that, because teleologically au-
tonomous, is not assessable, has been espoused, amongst others, by Rob-
ert Arrington. According to him, “[m]orality does not compete on […] any 
ground external to itself; it exists only to promote morally correct behav-
iour. […] If moral rules have their own internal ends, there is nothing in-
dependent of them that can be appealed to in order to determine if they 
are justified or not” (1989, 245–255).24 Another adherent of the autonomist 	  
23.  The required sort of fundamentality can neither be one which amounts to taking 
priority over the other value in cases of conflict nor one which amounts to incorporating 
the other value (such that the latter can be derived from the former). The relevant sense 
of fundamentality has to be one that contains a justification for (partially) abandoning 
one value in favour of the expansion of another. 
24.  Similar statements can be found in Charles Larmore’s The Autonomy of Morality, 
though he is more concerned with attempts to justify morality on the basis of non-moral 
considerations: “There is no way to reason ourselves into an appreciation of moral values 
from some standpoint outside of it. Morality only makes sense in its own terms.” (2008, 
88) 
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position is Paul Johnston, who points out that the search for a (further) 
basis of proof or justification is among the prevalent motives out of which 
philosophers try to ascribe to morality a certain telos: 
 
[A] basis for proof is sought by presenting morality as a vehicle for self-
interest or as a device with a certain social function. Such moves, however, 
are reductive and oﬀer a distorted picture of morality, for if one wishes to 
claim that morality has a point or purpose, then this point is no less contro-
versial than morality itself. (1989, 67)25 
 
Insofar as it cannot be shown that orientation towards a certain telos is al-
ready part of the constitutive rules of the established moral practice, any 
case in favour of ascribing a certain telos to morality will turn out to be ra-
ther meagre. It will have to rest on morality’s partial coincidence with a 
practice that indeed has the alleged telos. As Johnston points out, a philos-
opher’s willingness to rely on such a case will grow to the extent that she 
or he regards the established moral practice as being in (desperate) need 
of justification. The autonomist position does not hold that morality is in 
need of justification. To the extent that it can defend itself with respect to 
this point, it can aﬀord to not conceive of morality as a device with a cer-
tain function and thereby avoid being accused of depicting morality in a 
distorted way or of secretly changing the topic.  
The autonomist position draws upon several observations. One of 
them is that the analogy between morality and the law breaks down at 
certain important points. While the law can be assessed and modified on 
the basis of moral considerations, there is no obvious answer to the ques-
tion of which standard could play an analogous role in the case of morali-
ty. The analogy between morality and the law also suﬀers from another 
problem: for morality, there is no clear separation between judges and 
legislators whereas in law, there are clearly separated roles for the execu-
tion of acts of judgement and acts of legislation. Of course, in certain cases 
a person can occupy both roles: that of a judge and that of a legislator – 
but this is possible only because of a certain institutional embedment that 
guarantees that the two roles cannot be executed simultaneously. Legisla-	  
25.  A similar line of thought has been pursued by D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce. Ac-
cording to them, “[m]oral concepts are not functional. One can see what is to count as a 
good knife by asking what a knife is for, but can one see the point of generosity in the 
same way? To ask what generosity is for is simply to vulgarize the concept; it is like think-
ing that ‘It is more blessed to give than to receive’ is some kind of policy” (1965, 313). 
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tion is coordinated and stabilized by more or less clearly defined process-
es and regulations that are enforced by the state. The existence of these 
institutional elements is far from trivial. Without them, the multi-level 
structure of the law would collapse. 
Another consideration that speaks in favour of the autonomist position 
consists in the acknowledgement of the fact that the common ways of 
identifying the point, purpose or telos of a practice are not available in the 
case of morality. Morality is not an institution, i.e. not a product of con-
scious decisions and design. Theonomous assumptions aside, morality 
has not been invented – a fortiori not for a specific purpose (cf., for 
instance, Darwall 2013b, 87).26 It is thus not possible to identify its purpose 
by inquiring about the intentions of its creators. There is also no partici-
pation motive that could be regarded as typical. The most virtuous partic-
ipants of moral practice do not engage in it for a certain reason but rather 
act for reasons that, according to the standard of morality, are good rea-
sons, i.e. they help others because they are in need (and not because they 
thereby enhance their chances of receiving help under comparable cir-
cumstances). Of course, there are people who conform to moral rules for 
reasons not approved of by morality, but it is far from clear whether these 
people can be said to participate in the practice of morality, let alone rep-
resent its typical participants. In the end, it might be possible to identify 
the evolutionary telos of moral practice. However, such teloi are labelled 
“evolutionary” precisely because they are not teloi in the narrow sense of 
the word, i.e. something that has a guiding function for the participants of 
the respective practice. Having sex has a rather obvious evolutionary 
function, which is happily ignored most of the time by the majority of 
people in our culture. 
How about Wittgenstein’s remarks about the point of games (and so-
cial practices in general)? Do they provide additional clues as to how the 
point of moral practice could be identified? In one passage from the Philo-
sophical Investigations, it is suggested that there exists a close connection 
between knowing the point of a practice and knowing which rules are es-
sential to it and which are not: 
 	  
26.  As Jonathan Dancy points out, even though morality has not been invented by a 
group of experts, it may be that it is, as a matter of fact, conducive to certain purposes. 
However, this in itself does not make it possible to derive a set of requirements for moral 
codes (2004, 83). 
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[I]f a rule of the game prescribes that the kings are to be used for drawing 
lots before a game of chess, then that is an essential part of the game. What 
objection might one make to this? That one does not see the point of this 
prescription. Perhaps as one wouldn’t see the point either of a rule by 
which each piece had to be turned round three times before one moved it. 
If we found this rule in a board-game we should be surprised and should 
speculate about the purpose of the rule. (“Was this prescription meant to 
prevent one from moving without due consideration?”) [...] If I understand 
the character of the game aright—I might say—then this isn’t an essential 
part of it. (§§567-568) 
 
The connection between the point of a practice and the relative im-
portance of its diﬀerent rules can also be described as follows: by chang-
ing important rules of the practice, one risks rendering the latter point-
less, whereas changing unimportant rules does not have such an eﬀect. 
Now, are there rules that are constitutive to the common moral practice 
and that we regard as clearly less important than others? Most people 
would probably immediately think of those rules that determine what 
counts as a comparably minor wrongdoing. However, the case of morality 
is not really analogous to that of the board-games examined by Wittgen-
stein. That a certain kind of wrongdoing is less severe than another seems 
to be something which is also determined by moral rules, whereas there is 
no rule in chess according to which the rule that white draws first is less 
important than the rule that the king can only move one square at a time. 
In order to know that the rule determining who draws first in a game of 
chess is comparably unimportant, one has to have an idea about what the 
point of the game is. In contrast, the knowledge that littering is less severe 
an act than murder seems to be straightforwardly derivable from one’s 
acquaintance with the constitutive rules of moral practice. 
However, as Timo-Peter Ertz observes, the point of a practice is not de-
termined exclusively by its constitutive rules but also by its functional 
embedment in our lives, i.e. by its connections to other practices and by 
the nature of the occasions in which we typically engage in it (2008, 63–71). 
He illustrates this point by means of a somewhat bizarre example. We 
should imagine a practice the constitutive rules of which are identical to 
those of association football but the functional embedment of which is as 
follows: the “game” is only played once each year, namely at summer sol-
stice. In preparation for the event, the participants spend one year at an 
isolated facility (the so-called “players seminar”) where they purify them-
selves. During the game, the spectators have to maintain absolute silence. 
If the team in black wins, half of the crop is sacrificed; if the team in white 
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wins, half of the livestock is sacrificed. The winners are praised for the rest 
of their lives, whereas the losers are enslaved. In the event of a draw, the 
players themselves are sacrificed (2008, 10). Such a practice is of course 
more a rite than a game – even though its constitutive rules are identical 
to that of the football game. Whilst one could more or less plausibly claim 
that it belongs to the point of the football game to be entertaining, this 
cannot be said about the football rite because of the graveness of its con-
sequences (2008, 11). Accordingly, it makes sense to criticize participants 
of the football game who (out of excessive ambition) accept high risks re-
garding injuring others as well as themselves, participants who play very 
unattractively in order to secure victory or participants who are complete-
ly indiﬀerent with respect to the outcome of the game, by saying that they 
do not respect the point of the practice (2008, 70). In contrast, it is not so 
clear whether participants of the football rite who play in a very boring 
way in order to secure victory can be said to miss the point of the practice. 
What can be said about the functional embedment of the moral prac-
tice? It is not confined to a more or less specific context (as, for example, 
the above-described football rite or chess), but figures rather as an (argu-
ably) ultimate standard of behaviour that pervades all spheres of life at all 
times. Furthermore, as in the case of the law, no one can escape morality 
in order to avoid being treated by the others according to the correspond-
ing rules by “opting out of the game.” The pervasiveness of moral practice 
makes it hard if not impossible to derive clues regarding the nature of its 
point from an analysis of the types of situations in which people typically 
engage in it. In light of the pervasiveness and inescapability of moral prac-
tice, one could of course come to the popular conclusion that the point of 
moral education is to harmonize people’s desires and expectations to-
wards each other and that the point of the moral mode of reasoning is to 
provide humans with a peaceful means of conflict resolution. However, 
none of these alleged points of the moral practice allows one to argue for 
or against particular moral rules: aristocratic morality serves the purpose 
of social coordination no less than bourgeois morality, despite the exist-
ence of important diﬀerences in content between the two. At best, one can 
derive from the telos of social coordination the requirement that the areas 
of indeterminacy in the moral practice be reduced as much as possible. 
Yet, even if the two sides of a moral dispute (that exists because of the un-
derdeterminacy of a specific moral rule) agree that it would be better if 
the mentioned rule rendered a clear verdict regarding the case at issue, 
they still lack the resources to rationally argue in favour of a certain way 
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of specifying the relevant rule. This problem cannot be regarded as trivial, 
considering what can be at stake in certain cases of moral dispute.  
What about Wittgenstein’s claim that most practices would become 
useless, pointless or even impossible if certain general facts of nature (that 
is, environmental conditions as well as facts about human nature) were to 
change? A well-known passage of the Philosophical Investigations reads as 
follows: 
 
[I]f things were quite diﬀerent from what they actually are——if there 
were for instance no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule 
became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of 
roughly equal frequency——this would make our normal language-games 
lose their point.—The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance 
and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it fre-
quently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvi-
ous reason. (§142) 
 
Wittgenstein’s example involving suddenly growing and shrinking lumps 
of cheese is certainly far-fetched, but it serves well to illustrate the fact 
that a change in the environmental conditions can make it reasonable to 
change certain practices – or even abandon them completely. Henceforth, 
it suggests itself to approach the question regarding the point of morality 
via a reflection about whether certain changes of general facts about our 
world would prompt us to change the constitutive rules of moral practice. 
What, for example, if scarcity of material goods became a thing of the 
past? Would we, under such circumstances, think that the moral norms 
regarding the treatment of other people’s property should become more 
relaxed? This is a tempting thought, but it does not lead very far, for the 
answer to the moral question of how to treat the property of others de-
pends on the nature of the rules determining what makes something 
someone’s property in the first place, and these are not moral rules. 
Moreover, one should also notice that the moral rules with respect to the 
treatment of others’ property are already relatively sensitive to changes in 
the context in which the actions under consideration take place. For ex-
ample, we regard it as less severe if someone steals something in order to 
survive than if someone steals the same thing for reasons of convenience. 
That moral rules are already very context-sensitive and thereby able to do 
justice to quite a broad range of circumstances can also be observed when 
imagining a scenario in which it is significantly more dangerous to tell the 
truth than it is in the societies in which we live (e.g. a dictatorial regime 
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that strongly encourages people to denunciate dissenters). Would we not 
say that the moral rules regarding sincerity should be modified under 
such circumstances? I do not think so, for it seems that the rules of com-
mon morality do not demand that one tell the truth regardless of the ex-
pected consequences. 
Another example is a bit more complicated: what would we think 
about a scenario in which, for some reason, everyone has become much 
more resistant against psychological damage than people are today? 
Would the rules against treating people in humiliating ways become 
pointless under such circumstances? If an action counts as humiliating in 
virtue of its foreseeable production of a certain sort of psychological 
harm, then the rule becomes obsolete, because it becomes more or less 
impossible to violate it.27 However, rules that are obsolete or inapplicable 
in this sense should be distinguished from rules that can be violated but 
are nevertheless pointless. Philippa Foot’s famous rules prohibiting run-
ning around trees left-handed or looking at hedgehogs in the light of the 
moon (2002a, 107) arguably exemplify the latter case. Unlike in the case of 
inapplicable and obsolete rules, a substantial standard (of superior im-
portance or reliability) is needed in order to establish the pointlessness of 
rules of the latter kind.  
However, Foot does not so much argue for the pointlessness of rules of 
the above-mentioned sort but rather tries to defend the view that such 
rules do not deserve to be called “moral rules” because they are not “con-
nected with human good and harm” (2002b, 120). In her later writings, she 
further pursues this line of thought by arguing that what is morally good 
or virtuous depends in a very direct way on “essential features of specifi-
cally human life” (2001, 14). Following P. T. Geach (1956), she argues that 
“good” is an attributive rather than a predicative adjective; that is, it re-
sembles adjectives like “large” rather than “red”. “Large” picks out diﬀer-	  
27.  The situation would be diﬀerent if certain actions were to count as expressions of 
disrespect (and hence as humiliating) because they typically (though not always) pro-
duce a certain form of psychological harm. If, due to changes in the average person’s 
psychology, it were no longer the case that these actions typically had the mentioned 
eﬀect, this could lead to a change in their symbolic value that, in turn, would render the 
prohibition against humiliating treatment inapplicable to them. However, I think that it 
is fair to say that in such a case we are not really dealing with a modification of the moral 
rules themselves, but only with a change in the expressive qualities of certain actions. Of 
course, if humiliation consists in something that is not directly connected to causing psy-
chological damage, then a change in the average susceptibility to such damage is not par-
ticularly relevant in the first place. 
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ent sizes depending on what it is applied to, unlike “red” which always 
picks out the same colour: in basic terms, a large ant and a large elephant 
do not have the same size, whereas a red car and a red carpet have the 
same colour. In a similar manner, a good car is not good in the same way 
as a good computer is good – the form of their respective goodness de-
pends on the purposes for which these artefacts have been designed. In 
addition to this “secondary” sense of goodness – goodness with respect to 
our purposes – there exists, according to Foot, a “natural” sense of good-
ness that is attributable only to living things and does not depend on our 
wants, needs and purposes (2001, 26–27). According to Foot, the evaluation 
of living things in terms of this natural goodness is closely related to so-
called Aristotelian categoricals (i.e. statements manifesting a certain type 
of life-form description that will be further specified below). More specifi-
cally, Foot thinks that evaluative statements can be made “where there is 
intersection of two types of propositions: on the one hand, Aristotelian 
categoricals […], and on the other, propositions about particular individu-
als that are the subject of evaluation” (2001, 33). According to Foot, then, 
Aristotelian categoricals provide the standard against which we measure 
character traits and other features of particular members of a species.28 
We call individual living things (including plants) “bad” or “defective” to 
the extent that they diverge from the norms set by the Aristotelian cate-
goricals. 
Aristotelian categoricals are neither based on statistical data about the 
features commonly found in the members of a certain species nor are they 
statements about features that promote evolutionary fitness. They rather 
identify the features needed by individual members of the species for “de-
velopment, self-maintenance, and reproduction”29 (whereby the relevant 
features needed by one individual might sometimes be features of anoth-
er individual or features of a group of such individuals) (2001, 33).30 Ac-
cording to Foot, if these features have something to do with the quality of 	  
28.  Rosalind Hursthouse provides a comprehensive list of the things assessable with 
respect to species-specific goodness that includes the parts, operations, actions, desires 
and emotions of living things (1999, 202). 
29.  Hursthouse makes use of a similar list of natural ends. Hers, like Foot’s, includes 
the two ends of individual survival and reproduction (i.e. continuance of the species). In 
addition, Hursthouse’s list includes freedom from pain and species-specific enjoyment in 
the case of sentient beings and the good functioning of the group in the case of social an-
imals (1999, chap. 9). 
30.  These features will in many cases coincide with features that promote evolutionary 
fitness. 
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the will of rational creatures, we call them “virtues”, and many virtues 
have the eﬀect of benefitting creatures other than their bearer. 
Does ethical naturalism (i.e. the attempt to base ethics on considera-
tions of human nature in the way outlined above) constitute a threat to 
moral autonomism? This is not as obvious as it might seem at first glance, 
for it is unclear whether ethical naturalists of the described sort even hold 
revisionist or legislative ambitions. Foot’s ambitions rather seem to be di-
rected at the correct interpretation of our moral language; that is, she 
seems to be interested first and foremost in identifying the rules that actu-
ally govern the use of moral terms such as “good” and “virtuous”. An en-
terprise with this aim does not really have legislative or revisionist poten-
tial. 
Having said this, it is of course in principle possible to proceed diﬀer-
ently, namely by trying to argue that Aristotelian categoricals should be 
regarded as a standard for the assessment of moral practice. There is, 
however, a reason why the adherents of ethical naturalism have usually 
been reluctant to march in this direction. Gary Watson puts the problem 
in the form of a dilemma: “Either the theory’s pivotal account of human 
nature (or characteristic human life) will be morally indeterminate, or it 
[…] will [not] ground moral judgement but rather express it” (1990, 462–
463). While the question of which character traits or practices best con-
tribute to the realization of ends such as self-maintenance and reproduc-
tion might seem to be more or less straightforwardly empirical (though I 
will argue further down that it actually is not), the question of what pro-
motes human development and the good working of the group certainly is not: 
these phrases are much too vague to demarcate a clear end – unless of 
course they are specified in a way that draws upon traditional evaluative 
schemes or virtue concepts.31 However, such an account of human nature 
obviously fails to provide an independent standard against which the es-
tablished moral practice could be measured. 
The proponents of ethical naturalism are of course aware of this and 
are therefore rather cautious when it comes to making claims about the 
legislative potential of the conception of human nature they rely on. Mar-
tha Nussbaum emphasizes that the Aristotelian conception of human na-	  
31.  Whether cruelty towards animals counts as a vice according to ethical naturalism 
depends, for example, largely on how the end of “human development” is interpreted. 
Being cruel to certain animals certainly does not preclude the attainment of ends such as 
individual human survival or the continuance of the human species. 
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ture is “internal and evaluative” rather than “external and scientific” (1995) 
and Rosalind Hursthouse maintains that ethical naturalism “does not 
seek to establish its conclusions from ‘a neutral point of view’” (1999, 193). 
She furthermore makes a vague appeal to Otto Neurath’s metaphor of the 
sailors who must reconstruct their ship on the open sea, thereby suggest-
ing that, in ethics too, we need to work with what we have: our inherited 
common moral practice and a conception of human nature that is (at least 
in part) dependent on the latter (or at the very least heavily influenced by 
it). She claims that this suﬃces to put the ethical naturalists in a position 
from which they can “provide rational credentials for our beliefs about 
which character traits are the virtues, not merely re-express them” (1999, 
193), but she does not further elaborate on this point. However, a coher-
entist process of justification is only possible where the diﬀerent elements 
in the web of belief in which equilibrium is to be achieved are suﬃciently 
independent from each other to begin with. Whether this precondition is 
fulfilled in the case under consideration is far from clear – especially if 
one takes into consideration the fact that there are further points at which 
the whole enterprise of a legislative version of ethical naturalism would 
have to rely on the established moral practice in order to arrive at a de-
terminate picture of what counts as “good” and “virtuous”. In addition to 
how ends such as human development and the good functioning of the group 
are to be specified, other questions are left open by Foot’s and Hurst-
house’s catalogues of ends. For example, there is the question of how the 
diﬀerent ends in the catalogue are to be weighed in relation to one anoth-
er32 and how ends such as individual survival and freedom from pain are 
precisely to be realized. Should this be in a way that gives equal weight to 
everyone or that maximizes the total number of beneficiaries – or rather 
in one of the many other imaginable ways? Leaving these questions unan-
swered provides the adherents of ethical naturalism with the luxury of be-
ing able to state criteria for human goodness and virtuousness that are 
appealing at first glance, while at the same time being able to reconstruct 
or criticize parts of the traditional catalogue of virtues ad libitum. 
Proponents of ethical naturalism could at this point insist that, while 
their account does not provide us with the resources necessary to subject 
the traditional catalogue of virtues to detailed criticism, some coarse-	  
32.  Whether celibacy and homosexuality turn out to be vices depends on whether ends 
such as human development and species-specific enjoyment sometimes take priority 
over the end of species-continuance. 
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grained assessments are nevertheless well within the reach of its capabili-
ties. For example, an assessment according to which rules prohibiting 
running round trees left-handed and looking at hedgehogs in the light of 
the moon have nothing to do with moral goodness and virtuousness and 
are generally pointless. However, it is unclear why we should think that 
ethical naturalism is needed to arrive at such a conclusion with respect to 
rules of the mentioned sort. The opponents of ethical naturalism could 
insist that the reason for which we spontaneously assess these rules nega-
tively simply consists in their divergence from common moral practice, 
which of course assigns an important role to human needs and interests. 
Because of this, it is very hard to tell whether we do anything more than 
re-express the common moral practice when we assess it positively in vir-
tue of the fact that its inculcation into the members of a society tends to 
promote the fulfilment of human needs and interests. 
Some will still be dissatisfied with this answer. Is it not obvious, it 
might be asked, that it is due to facts about the relative non-injuriousness 
of litter to humans (and hence due to facts about human nature) that we 
have rules determining that murder is worse than littering, and not vice 
versa? To this, it can however be replied that it is one thing to say that 
general facts about (human) nature have had an influence on the shape of 
our moral practice, and quite another to say that moral practice can or 
should be justified by referring to facts of human nature. Autonomism 
with respect to moral practice stands at odds with the latter claim, but not 
with the former. We might, because of our biological make-up and the 
environmental conditions we live in, find certain practices natural, but, as 
Wittgenstein argued, acting in certain ways (e.g. continuing the series “2, 
4, 6, 8, …” with “…1000, 1002, 1004, …” rather than with “…1000, 1004, 1008, 
…”) “is not correct because it is natural. If anything, it is because we find it 
natural that we make it correct” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 217), that is, es-
tablish a corresponding practice.33 It should be added that what we find 
natural depends not only upon factors such as our biological nature and 
the environmental conditions we live in, but also upon the training and 
conditioning we receive in our childhood. Our needs, interests, reactions 
and dispositions can be shaped to a certain degree through the early in-
culcation of certain practices. Hence, certain practices have a tendency to 
perpetuate themselves: they demand of their participants to make certain 
ways of acting seem natural to their children. Of course, not every imagi-	  
33.  Cf. Zettel, §331. 
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nable practice can be crafted upon our human nature, but the latter 
leaves enough leeway for a vast multitude of second natures, of which not 
all need to have the eﬀect of promoting human wellbeing. One could im-
agine, for example, a culture the members of which, due to a kind of ob-
session with personal strength and overcoming challenges, have come to 
adopt practices that tend to reduce their wellbeing (as we understand it).34 
Foot and her followers might insist that a practice of this sort could no 
longer be described as a “moral practice” due to a content-restriction on 
what counts as a “moral system”. However, at this point in the investiga-
tion, it is not of much interest to dispute how the term “moral” is to be 
used. A practice of the mentioned sort could be embedded into our lives 
in a way strongly resembling that of our moral practice: it could take the 
form of an ultimate standard of behaviour and play an important role in 
licencing Strawsonian “reactive attitudes” such as indignation, blame, an-
ger, etc. The point in imagining such alternative moral practices (“moral” 
being used in a non-committal, ethnographical sense here) is not to dele-
gitimize our moral practice but to remind us of the fact that human well-
being cannot be regarded as a standard independent of our moral prac-
tice, against which our moral practice as well as alternative ones can be 
measured. 
The most radical but probably also most elegant and promising way to 
argue in favour of the teleological autonomy of morality is via the claim 
that common morality partially shapes our concepts of reasoning and jus-
tification, i.e. that it partially determines what counts as a good reason or 
as a valid justification tout court (cf. Hanfling 2003, 38–40). This is not an ad 
hoc manoeuvre; it is independently supported by the fact that not only ac-
tions but also reasons can be assessed with respect to their moral quality. 
This facet of the moral practice constitutes a crucial diﬀerence to most 
other practices we know. The existence of other practices might influence 
what reasons we have in a certain situation (for example, by imposing cer-	  
34.  Confronted with criticism holding that their practice should be modified because it 
fails to promote human wellbeing, the members of such a culture might reply: “Well of 
course, that is exactly the point of it.” Alternatively, they might adhere to a conception of 
wellbeing that narrows wellbeing down to success in overcoming challenges and in en-
during hardships. It is the latter possibility D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce refer to in 
their critique of ethical naturalism when they write that “what must be recognised is that 
there are diﬀerent conceptions of human good and harm” (1970, 53) and “that human 
good is not independent of the moral beliefs people hold, but is determined by them” 
(1965, 314). 
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tain sanctions on certain forms of behaviour), but they have no influence 
on what counts as a good reason. The crucial point, according to this rea-
soning, is that moral practice cannot be assessed because it belongs to the 
ultimate means of assessment. A similar line of thought is present in 
Wittgenstein’s insistence that we cannot criticize our “form of life” (i.e. the 
totality of the verbal and non-verbal practices of a culture) as a whole, that 
is including the parts of it which provide the means of rational criticism 
(see Glock 1996, 124–129). 
Wittgenstein’s point about the immanence of justification is closely re-
lated to his frequently cited remarks about the finitude of justification. Jus-
tification and reason-giving are practices too,35 and once the correct justi-
fication moves are executed, not much remains to be done. We quickly 
and inevitably arrive at a point where all that can be said are things like 
“Well, this is what is called ‘giving a reason’” or “This is what we do” 
(Wittgenstein 1968, §217). It is of course not surprising that such claims 
raise suspicions – especially among philosophers, who are trained to call 
everything into question and to ask for reasons even for things most peo-
ple take for granted. Everyone should be suspicious of people who de-
mand that one accept their position while refusing to give reasons for it, 
and the position defended here “seems to allow anyone who is having 
diﬃculty justifying her position to escape simply by invoking bedrock” 
(Johnston 1999, 62). However, the point about the finitude of justification 
is not about accepting a certain substantial position without reasons, but 
about a structural point regarding the practice of justification or reason 
giving. If it is true that all justifications come to an end sooner or later, one 
has to distinguish between two kinds of situations in which no reasons 
can be provided: the situation where a chain of reasons has come to an 
end and the situation where no suﬃcient reasons were ever present in the 
first place. It is to the danger of confusing these two that Abraham Melden 
alerts us in the following passage: 
 
To conclude […] that the moral attitude, since it can not [sic] be supported 
by any reason, is unreasonable is to confuse the present case in which no 
reason in principle is possible with the familiar situation in which reasons, 
while possible, are not forthcoming. Indeed, the moral attitude requires no 	  
35.  By saying that there is a form of justification that transcends all conceptual systems 
and forms of life, one at best expresses one’s strong allegiance to the standard of rational-
ity of a specific conceptual system or form of life.  
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reason since it defines, implicitly, what it means to be reasonable in our at-
titude towards others. (1948, 455) 
 
Asking for reasons at a point where no reasons can be provided because 
the chain of reasons has come to an end (and not because no reasons ex-
isted in the first place) testifies to either the incompetence or the unwill-
ingness of the questioner to participate in the moral practice. In both cas-
es, little remains to be done on the argumentative level. Not every de-
mand for a reason or justification is legitimate. Unless this is taken into 
consideration, the danger of coming up with pseudo-justifications at a 
point where justifications would otherwise no longer be possible is equal-
ly great to that of letting something unjustifiable stand unquestioned (cf. 
Wittgenstein 1967, §314).36 
What makes the proposal delineated above seem unattractively radical 
is that it apparently leaves no conceptual room for such a thing as a ra-
tional argument in favour of the moral practice and, hence, specifically 
moral progress.37 Because of a phenomenon that could be called “histori-	  
36.  Philosophers who work in the Wittgensteinian tradition and try to defend the claim 
that certain propositions in the domain of morality are not further justifiable usually as-
similate these propositions either (a) to constitutive rules (i.e. “grammatical proposi-
tions”) or (b) to so-called “hinge propositions” or “basic certainties” as discussed in Witt-
genstein’s On Certainty. For the former see, for example, Arrington (1989, 248–315), Han-
fling (2003; 2008) and Kiesselbach (2012, 56–79). For the latter see, for example, Pleasants 
(2008; 2009) and Wachtendorf (2008, 184–188). Hinge propositions are propositions that 
play a “peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions” (OC, §136) to the 
eﬀect that they cannot be supported by evidence because there are no more fundamental 
propositions that could support them. Hinge propositions are sometimes assimilated to 
grammatical propositions because they too are in a certain way constitutive of a practice, 
namely that of doubting: “Doubt presupposes not only the possibility of certainty, but 
that many things are certain” (Glock 1996, 80). However, assimilating hinge propositions 
to grammatical propositions is problematic insofar as the negation of hinge propositions 
(as opposed to that of grammatical propositions) is commonly taken to make sense. Un-
fortunately, I can neither inquire further into this issue nor conduct an assessment of the 
relative merits of two above-mentioned approaches in the confines of the present paper. 
37.  Not every widespread change in moral views is due to a change of the moral prac-
tice. The moral assessment of a particular situation in real life always depends on empir-
ical assumptions – assumptions that sometimes turn out to be untenable. Moral change 
based exclusively on a change of the underlying empirical views should be distinguished 
from moral change based on a change of the evaluative practice, i.e. the practice map-
ping evaluative, normative and deontic predicates to certain situations. Whether particu-
lar historical cases of changes in moral views are of the former or the latter sort is a ques-
tion that must be left to the historians. The same applies for the question of whether 
changes in empirical beliefs have sometimes led to changes in evaluative practices. 	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cal blindness,” this problem does not become acute as long as one only 
examines the moral changes of the past. Since we have no other choice 
but to apply to these changes our present standard of moral rationality, 
we inevitably come to the conclusion that the development of the present 
moral practice out of its previous states has been an improvement (and 
the same of course holds for assessments of the current moral practice 
from the perspective of its future states). It is primarily to the present ad-
vocates of ideological change that the autonomist position as specified 
above has to appear unacceptably conservative. According to the auton-
omist position, moral practice partially determines what counts as a good 
reason, and hence, every reason presented against the moral practice ipso 
facto amounts to a petitio principii: it is argued that X is not a (good) reason 
on the basis of the assumption that Y (which, according to X is not a good 
reason) is a good reason. But is this really the case? For this conclusion is a 
non sequitur if one assumes that certain tensions or inconsistencies already 
exist in the justificatory practices that make up a part of our form of life. 
According to Sabina Lovibond, people are able “(in virtue of the internal 
tensions or contradictions of [their] community’s form of life) to subject 
certain features of the established Sittlichkeit to an appraisal in terms of 
evaluative concepts which have their institutional basis elsewhere within 
the culture: that is how [they] will manage to be […] critic[s]” (1980, 130). 
This idea is very appealing at first glance. Unfortunately, however, it is al-
so very hard to substantiate the notion of an inconsistency between two 
(or more) constitutive rules.38 What does it mean to say that, according to 	  
However, whether specifically moral changes have ever occurred in the history of man-
kind is irrelevant with respect to the tenability of the points made in the present paper. 
38.  It should be mentioned at this point that the notion of inconsistency we are most 
familiar with in the moral context is not that of an inconsistency on the level of constitu-
tive rules. I speak of the notion of inconsistency involved in the familiar argumentative 
scheme of claiming that it is “inconsistent” to regard it as permissible for A to V while re-
garding it as impermissible for B to V (or to regard it as permissible to treat A in a certain 
way while regarding it as impermissible to treat B in the same way). Arguments that fit 
this scheme must be regarded as practice-immanent justification moves. For whether the 
diﬀerences between A and B are morally relevant, and hence whether it is adequate to 
assess the respective cases diﬀerently, depends on the standards inherent to the practice. 
To say that it is “inconsistent” to treat them diﬀerently amounts to nothing more than 
saying that the standard inherent to the moral practice provides no conclusive argumen-
tative resources in favour of treating the respective cases diﬀerently (cf. §§224-225 of the 
Philosophical Investigations, where an analogous claim is made regarding the concept of 
sameness). On appeals to consistency in moral disputes compare also Johnston (1999, 61–
65). 
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one of the rules of chess, the bishop only moves diagonally whilst accord-
ing to another, it only moves horizontally and vertically? At best, this can 
be taken to mean that there simply does not (yet) exist a rule regarding 
how the bishop moves – the two cited rules being supported by diﬀerent 
groups of people who have a say with respect to the design of the game of 
chess. There is no such thing as a conflict between constitutive rules – 
there are only conflicting ways of reducing the underdeterminacy of con-
stitutive rules.  
Be that as it may, it should be noticed that none of what has been 
claimed above speaks against the possibility of a scenario in which a 
group of people start to find it natural to change to a moral practice slight-
ly diﬀerent from the one in which they used to take part without being 
able to justify their transition by reference to considerations which would 
count as good reasons under the earlier practice. However, if they succeed 
in committing themselves fully to the new practice (i.e. develop corre-
sponding emotional and motivational reactions), they will, because of the 
above-described phenomenon of historical blindness, regard their devel-
opment as an improvement.39  
5. Conclusion 
In the present paper, I have discussed the question of whether it is possi-
ble, adequate or even necessary to take up a legislative perspective on the 
common moral practice. In light of our treatment of other practices, one 
should expect it to be possible to either hold morality against another 
standard (if the latter is more important, more accurate or more reliable 
in a relevant sense) or assess whether it does full justice to its point or te-
los. That such an assessment of the common moral practice is possible 
seems to be a widely-shared assumption among moral philosophers. I 
have discussed two relatively recent projects in normative ethics that op-
erate under this assumption, namely neo-Hobbesian contractarianism 
and rule-consequentialism, and have tried to show that they run into cer-
	  
39.  For a diﬀerent way of defending the autonomist position against the charge of 
dogmatic conservativism, see Rentsch (1999). 
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tain problems. I then discussed the autonomist position, according to 
which the common moral practice has no point or telos in the usual sense 
by reference to which it can be assessed. To deny that moral practice has a 
point or telos of the sort that other practices have is of course not to say 
that morality is pointless in the familiar deprecatory sense of the word. It is 
less misleading to say, following Robert Arrington, that moral practice on-
ly has an internal point, namely the promotion of morally correct behav-
iour. What speaks in favour of the autonomist position is first and fore-
most the fact that the usually successful methods for the identification of 
the point of a practice fail when they are applied to the common moral 
practice. Furthermore, there is a certain appeal to the assumption that 
moral practice partially determines what counts as a good reason and a 
valid justification tout court, for it helps to account for the witnessed diﬃ-
culties that emerge from the attempt to take up a legislative perspective 
on common morality. What seems to speak against the autonomist posi-
tion is that it does not appear to leave much room for such a thing as ra-
tional moral change and thereby raises the suspicion that it ultimately 
amounts to a sort of dogmatic conservatism. I have argued that it is diﬃ-
cult to substantiate charges of this sort and that, because of the phenome-
non of historical blindness, the autonomist story does not conflict with 
what people who change to a new moral practice typically think about the 
transition. 
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